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Essays on International Migration
Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga
International migration happens because individuals 
want to increase their personal welfare by moving to a new 
country. In addition, it has effects on the welfare of those 
who decide not to migrate and remain in their origin coun-
tries. This dissertation looks at the overall topic of interna-
tional migration from three very different angles: 1) who the 
migrants are or the study of the productive characteristics of 
migrating individuals with respect to nonmigrants, 2) what 
the long run effect of migration is and specifi cally whether it 
can contribute to Social Security sustainability, and 3) why 
countries sign bilateral migration agreements to try to regu-
late migration fl ows.
In Chapter 1, “New Evidence on Emigrant Selection,” 
I examine the extent to which Mexican emigrants to the 
United States are negatively selected; that is, they have lower 
skills than individuals who remain in Mexico. Previous stud-
ies have been limited by the lack of nationally representative 
longitudinal data. This one uses a newly available household 
survey, which identifi es emigrants before they leave and al-
lows a direct comparison to nonmigrants. I fi nd that, on aver-
age, U.S.-bound Mexican emigrants from 2000 to 2004 earn 
a lower wage and have fewer schooling years than individu-
als who remain in Mexico, evidence of negative selection. 
This supports the original hypothesis of Borjas (1987) and 
argues against recent fi ndings, notably those of Chiquiar and 
Hanson (2005). The discrepancy with the latter is primarily 
due to an undercount of unskilled migrants in U.S. sources 
and secondarily to the omission of unobservables in their 
methodology.
Studying emigrant selection is relevant because it affects 
welfare and its distribution both in immigrant-receiving and 
in emigrant-sending countries. Thus, economists have long 
tried to explain how emigrants self-select. On the theory side, 
Borjas (1987) stated that most immigrants should be low 
skilled when the reward to skills or earnings inequality in 
their home country is higher than the reward to skill or earn-
ings inequality in the receiving country. This is the case be-
tween Mexico and the United States (2006) so that negative 
selection, meaning that emigrants are on average less skilled 
or productive than those who do not migrate, should charac-
terize migration fl ows between the two countries. However, 
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) found that Mexican immigrants 
in the United States originated in the medium-high range 
of the Mexican wage distribution, which is interpreted as 
evidence of positive selection. Their data on Mexican im-
migrants came mainly from the U.S. census, which is known 
to suffer from undercounting immigrants, especially if they 
are undocumented. Other studies fi nding positive selection 
were mainly based on the Mexican Migration Project, which 
provides detailed information about a particular region in 
Mexico but is not representative of the whole country.
This chapter addresses these data problems by using the 
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Trimestral (ENET) and the 
Quarterly National Labor Survey (INEGI). This household 
survey is representative at a national level and it follows 
households for fi ve quarters so that it allows recovering the 
wage income and other characteristics (like education) of 
Mexican emigrants (both documented and undocumented) 
in the previous quarter to that in which they decided to leave 
the country. The wage distribution of Mexican emigrants 
is shifted to the left of the wage distribution of Mexican 
nonmigrants for both men and women. As long as the wage 
is a valid measure of the marginal product of labor, this 
implies that Mexican emigrants to the United States are on 
average less productive than those who remain at home. In 
conclusion, the main result of this chapter is the existence of 
negative selection in the emigration fl ows from Mexico to 
the United States for the period 2000–2004.
The procedure to test the selectivity of emigrants from 
Mexico to the United States is similar to Chiquiar and 
Hanson’s (2005) methodology. They compare the 1990 and 
2000 distribution of wages from individuals in the Mexi-
can census with the counterfactual wage densities Mexican 
immigrants to the United States would obtain were they to 
return to Mexico according to their characteristics in the 
corresponding U.S. census. Chiquiar and Hanson follow the 
DiNardo et al. (1996) approach to build counterfactual wage 
densities and fi nd they lie to the right of the actual resident 
wage distribution, interpreting this as evidence of positive to 
intermediate selection in terms of observable skills refl ected 
in the wage. The ENET does not require the construction of 
counterfactual wage densities since actual wages of future 
emigrants can be observed directly. The only exercise is to 
estimate wage densities for migrants and nonmigrants based 
on the direct observation of their wages at the same period 
and to compare them. Contrary to Chiquiar and Hanson, I 
fi nd evidence of negative selection in terms of skills (both 
observable and unobservable) refl ected in the wage levels. 
The comparison of the schooling distributions of migrants 
and nonmigrants also displays negative selection.
The discrepancy between this chapter and Chiquiar and 
Hanson could be related to three factors. First, their results 
refl ect selection in the stock of migrants in the United States, 
obtained from the U.S. census, whereas the information in 
the ENET corresponds to selection on the fl ow of migrants. 
Second, their methodology cannot take potentially relevant 
unobservable characteristics into consideration in the estima-
tion of counterfactual wages. Third, U.S. sources are known 
to undercount Mexican immigrants. All three explanations 
can be explored with the ENET data.
In order to address the fi rst point, stock versus fl ows, 
whenever I replicate Chiquiar and Hanson’s result, I use 
information only on recently arrived Mexican immigrants. 
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Recently arrived migrants are those who have only been in 
the United States for less than a year, the closest possible 
concept to measuring fl ows in U.S. sources. To investigate 
which of the two other factors is responsible for the differ-
ences in results, I fi rst ignore the information on emigrant 
wages from the ENET and use only the emigrants’ observ-
able characteristics to counterfactually estimate their wage 
levels. I fi nd that negative selection still characterizes the 
emigration fl ows, although the degree of selection is lower 
than the one obtained when actual wages are employed. This 
is evidence that there is negative selection on both observa-
bles and unobservables. It follows that the methodology 
biases the result toward fi nding positive selection, although 
not enough to overturn the negative selection outcome. I 
then ignore all the information on emigrants available in the 
ENET and use data on recently arrived Mexican immigrants 
from U.S. sources instead. In this case, I fi nd that the results 
are consistent with those of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), and 
positive selection is obtained. These results suggest that the 
undercount of low-skilled immigrants in U.S. data sources 
is the main reason why this chapter fi nds negative selection 
whereas Chiquiar and Hanson fi nd positive selection.
In the case of the other group of studies fi nding posi-
tive emigrant selection from Mexico to the United States, 
their main drawback is that the data sources used are either 
incomplete (the U.S. census undercounts Mexican undocu-
mented immigrants and the Mexican census does not record 
the education level of emigrants) or nonrepresentative at a 
national level (MMP), which forced researchers to impose 
strong assumptions on the data. For example, I show that us-
ing the MMP as representative of Mexico is misleading since 
the ENET shows that rural Mexico is actually characterized 
by positive selection and the general negative selection result 
is driven by urban Mexico. In fact, it can be said that this 
chapter does not contradict any previous work but rather 
complements their main inconveniences.
Chapter 2, “Fiscal Sustainability and Public Debt in an 
Endogenous Growth Model,” coauthored with Jean-Pierre 
Vidal, investigates fi scal sustainability in an overlapping 
generations economy with endogenous growth coming from 
human capital formation through educational spending. We 
assess how budgetary imbalances affect economic dynamics 
and the outlook for economic growth, thereby providing a 
rationale for fi scal rules ensuring sustainability. Our results 
show that the appropriate response of fi scal policy to tempo-
rary shocks is not trivial in the absence of fi scal rules. Fiscal 
rules allow for a timely reaction, thereby avoiding possibly 
disruptive fi scal adjustment in the future: the more adjust-
ment is delayed, the larger its necessary scale is. We perform 
a rough calibration of the model to simulate the effects of a 
demographic shock (change in the population growth rate) 
under different fi scal policy scenarios. The demographic 
shock can also be interpreted as a change in the immigra-
tion rate so that the model can be used to study the effects 
of immigration on key macroeconomic variables in a partial 
equilibrium setting. It is partial equilibrium in the sense that 
immigrants do not respond to wage differential but are mod-
elled as an exogenous shock instead.
The tax and transfer system examined in this chapter 
is fairly rich. Pension benefi ts are assumed to be paid in a 
lump-sum manner. Individuals pay a proportional tax on 
labor income and at the same time they either pay a lump-
sum tax or receive a lump-sum transfer. Labor income 
taxation is characterized by high top marginal tax rates and 
relatively lower average effective tax rates, refl ecting the 
progressiveness of income taxation. This is well captured in 
our model by combining a proportional income tax with a 
lump-sum transfer. In addition to the tax-benefi t system, the 
government fi nances general public spending, which benefi ts 
individuals but does not distort their economic decisions, and 
issues bonds. As individuals maximize utility and therefore 
react to fi scal policy, the model provides a suitable frame-
work to inquire about fi scal sustainability.
Overlapping generations’ models are suitable theoreti-
cal tools to address fi scal sustainability issues. Since the 
Ricardian equivalence does not apply in these models and 
debt dynamics are in general unstable, fi scal rules are needed 
to maintain fi scal sustainability. There are two sources of 
economic growth in our model: the accumulation of physi-
cal capital and the formation of human capital. The accu-
mulation of physical capital stems from individual savings. 
Endogenous growth results from the formation of human 
capital, which is assumed to result from parental education 
and educational spending, fi nanced out of altruism. The 
human capital part of the model includes another channel 
through which government debt affects the economy. Not 
only is physical capital crowded out by government debt, 
but human capital is as well so that the growth potential of 
the economy is affected. In other words, not only the steady 
state level of capital is altered, as it is in existing exogenous 
growth models, but also the growth rate.
The main fi ndings are the following. First, the existence 
of steady states is not suffi cient to ensure fi scal sustainability. 
Second, in the presence of multiple steady states, the initial 
conditions in the economy matter for the long-run equilib-
rium that will result from economic dynamics. Third, the 
stability properties of the economy depend on the set of fi scal 
instruments, that is, on the adopted fi scal rules. Fiscal policy 
rules are generally needed to ensure the stability of equilibria 
that are dynamically effi cient.
The appropriate response of fi scal policy to exogenous 
temporary shocks is not trivial in the absence of fi scal rules. 
If temporary small shocks occur in the neighborhood of a 
stable steady state, there is no strong case for adjustments 
to fi scal policy, as the economy can come back to its initial 
position by itself. However, when temporary shocks occur 
in the neighborhood of an unstable steady state, which is the 
standard case in an economy with public debt, they endanger 
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fi scal sustainability. Without timely reaction to such shocks, 
ensuring fi scal sustainability would require adjustments, pos-
sibly of a disruptive nature, in the future: the more the adjust-
ment is delayed, the larger its necessary scale is. Fiscal rules 
preserving fi scal sustainability seem more appropriate to deal 
with small shocks, as they timely maintain the economy on a 
sustainable path and do not lead to disruptive adjustments.
We illustrate this point by performing a rough simulation 
in which a baseline version of our model, parameterized to 
fi t the values of economic variables in the pre-enlargement 
European Union, is exposed to a demographic shock. To be 
precise, we assume that the projected decrease in population 
happens in the next 50 years and show how this can lead to 
unsustainable debt unless a fi scal rule is introduced.
Chapter 3, “The Case for International Cooperation in 
Migration Policies,” explains how unilateral migration 
policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to 
try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral 
migration agreements. One element of these agreements is 
the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-re-
ceiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their 
emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their 
migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical 
model that justifi es this behavior by combining a two-coun-
try, two-good classical Ricardian model with welfare-maxi-
mizing governments. These governments establish migration 
quotas that need to be enforced at a cost (modeled according 
to Ethier [1986]). I prove that Nash unilateral migration 
policies are ineffi cient whereas both countries can improve 
welfare by exchanging a more “generous” migration quota 
or terms of trade advantages for expenditure on enforcement 
policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does 
not depend on the enforcement technology that both coun-
tries employ. The Ricardian assumption is not crucial either 
and a generalization of the model is introduced.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an institution 
where countries can get together and negotiate mutually ben-
efi cial trade agreements. When countries set their tariffs uni-
laterally, they hurt other countries because they improve their 
own terms of trade at the expense of others’ terms of trade. 
This creates a Prisoner’s Dilemma where countries would 
be better off if they all lowered their tariffs, but in fact they 
do not have the incentive to do so unilaterally. In order to re-
move this ineffi ciency, international cooperation is required 
and is obtained through the WTO. A key element why inter-
national cooperation enhances effi ciency is the assumption 
that freer trade increases world output. This chapter shows 
that a similar reasoning can be applied to migration policy. 
Most theoretical models of migration coincide in conclud-
ing that the free movement of factors contributes to better 
allocation of resources at the world level. In most cases, the 
upper estimate of these effi ciency gains is notably superior to 
the effi ciency gains that can be expected from, for example, 
free trade. The typical explanation about why these immense 
effi ciency gains are not obtained through international coop-
eration is that the movement of people has opposing effects 
on immigrant receiving and emigrant-sending countries. 
Immigrant-receiving countries tend to ask for lower migra-
tion whereas emigrant-sending countries tend to ask for freer 
migration, at least in terms of low-skill migrants.
However, as of 2004, there were at least 176 bilateral 
agreements on migration issues. One useful starting point to 
address the economic justifi cation behind all of these is to 
incorporate the arguments that are currently given for signing 
bilateral migration agreements. According to the background 
paper for the joint IOM/World Bank/WTO Trade and Migra-
tion Seminar (2004), the reasons why migrant-receiving 
countries sign these agreements are combating irregular 
migration, responding to labor market needs of temporary or 
permanent nature, and promoting economic links with send-
ing countries. On the other hand, the reasons why sending 
states agree to sign these bilateral agreements are reliev-
ing labor surpluses, protecting the rights of their nationals 
abroad, and limiting the effects of brain drain by ensuring the 
return of their nationals.
The models presented in this chapter concentrate on the 
fi rst point of both sets of objectives, that is, the reason for 
immigrant-receiving countries to sign an agreement will be 
the will to combat irregular migration. For some reason, they 
will consider that additional immigration is welfare-reduc-
ing. On the contrary, emigrant sending countries will want to 
relieve their labor market surplus, that is, they will consider 
that additional emigration is welfare-improving for them.
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